Why China Stiffs the US on Nuclear Arms Control

Photo by Maria Oswalt on Unsplash

This just in:

China has rejected US efforts to resume talks on arms control, following a November 2023 meeting on nuclear weapons that left US officials hopeful of continuing negotiations with their Chinese counterparts.

I can think of two or three hypotheses that explain why China has rebuffed America’s proposal to hold another round of arms control/strategic stability dialogue with the US. I’ll get to that below, but before I do, I just want to make a couple quick points.

First, as readers of the newsletter know, I recently released a big (as in long) report proposing dozens of ways to reduce risks of nuclear war in Northeast Asia. Most of them involved China and the US. And one of them was recently taken up by the State Department, at least rhetorically. I recommended this:

A couple weeks later, Assistant Secretary of State Mallory Stewart said this:

I don’t know if my report made it into the right hands or if Stewart’s staff already had a no-first use nuclear dialogue with China on their minds.

But whether I get credit for it is not important—what matters is that a lot of nuke bros in the national security state think my recommendations are radical or unrealistic. Not only is that silly; it’s a way for them to feel justified not engaging with the logic of my arguments. Most of my recommendations have antecedents in prior policy proposals by self-identified “nonpartisan” nuke bros from past eras or are literally being proposed by the extremely change-averse Biden administration now.

The second thing is that, as much as I criticize US policy—and I’ve made it an art form—China is its own worst enemy. I find it extremely frustrating that the CCP is too myopic to reign in its own exceptionalism. US policy is so dangerously adrift that it would not be hard for the CCP to claim moral superiority…but it would involve serious efforts to build confidence on the world stage.

How? By getting a grip on the PLA, wolf-warrior diplomacy, and the maritime militia activity in the South China Sea, which is just aggressive. By making some attempt at transparency about its naval, missile, and nuclear modernization efforts. And by ACCEPTING proposals to have diplomatic meetings—low bar, man.

From what I see, China looks like just another great power. And ain’t no great power coming to save you. Or any of us.

Ok, on to the hypotheses.