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Greg Sanders's avatar

Speaking in my personal capacity as usual...

Interesting Brodie discussion and makes sense. I was always skeptical of the argument for tactical nukes, even if my CSIS colleagues had more concrete arguments than optionality. But as you say, optionality can be the problem there!

So my expreience in the budget caps era was an emphasis on Better Buying Power 2.0. The pivot to Asia was the pivot away from the CentCom and to a lesser exent Europe because choices and hard trade offs were necessary. The pivot had some big setbacks, including the forced error of the Libya war and then ISIS [conquering northern Iraq]. Optionality and two-construct were terms thrown around, though primacy was something I only heard in the argot of critical colleagues, mostly CATO, though vocabulary varies a lot from segment to segment.

That said, I'd push back against "If the Iran War teaches us anything, it should be that bullshit wars are proliferating; and if they are possible, they are also inevitable." To qoute a wise strategist "Yet the belief that war is inevitable hinges on assuming Chinese intent from Chinese military capabilities while we expect others to not assume the same about us." [I don't think inevitablity is a correct analysis in either circumstance.]

For all its faults, liberal internationalism managed to avoid a major involving with Iran for some [over two decades, not conting the Trump years] since the end of the Iran-Iraq war because some level of competence and chastisement from other operations precluded it. More personalistic decision making styles, as is seen in the world's three great powers in the present moment, are more prone to catastrophic error, although even then I wouldn't call conflict inevitable.

I think it's a fair critique of hegemony that maintaining the forces necessary for hegemony results in more situations where high-risk options seem in the realm of the possible; however, most any great power will typically have some such situatiosn in their near abroad in the absence of collective self defense constructs.

I think the logic of Obama's pivot still holds but would have benefited from harder to reverse steps away from CENTCOM and an embrace collective defense measures by the EU. Where I disagree with your argument on optionality is that I consider Taiwan to be a manifestly plausible scenario, given Xi's rhetoric and capability, but one where complicating CCP coercive options does have real deterrance value that can justify real expense. That said, as weaponized Keynesian in a time of high interest rates but robust employment, aside from cutting off support for the war in Iran, paying that cost would mean a willingness to raise taxes beyond what's necessary to just roll back cuts to Medicaid and Obamacare. (Keynisian-ism only means running large deficits in certain circumstances). Allied spending and industrial investment and cooperation does make that easier at least, but that still leaves left-liberals in an environment where Brodie's burden of proof logic should be front of mind. Thanks for wading through his prose to highlight a sharp point.

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