So, as a normie international relations liberal, I can accept most of your premises about China here (let's set aside good neighbor analogy) but I think your definition of hegemony, while perfectly reasonable, is not what Walt or standard Washignton discourse is talking about.
So agree to be condemned for my view that the post-WWII and post-Cold War era was on the balance good while America certainly did horrific things during it on a grand scale.
So I hold the modal international relations liberal view that the norm against changes borders with force is a critical underlying part of that order. It's a subset of "the stability of a norm-based political order (sovereign borders)" but a vital one and one that is a foundational part of any world order that lmits domination. (Regarding the larger norm, the U.S. has violated sovereignty in many ways, including interventions that broke the rules that it established and were terrible ideas on both prudential and humanitarian grounds. The second and third Gulf wars both being examples that are contributing directly to U.S. decline for a multitude of reasons).
Russia did not need the opportunity to become a regional hegemon to invade Ukraine in 2014 or 2022. China does not need the power to become a regional hegemon to invade Taiwan (admittedly an edge case in international law), in the South China sea, or with India.
The premise in Pacific Power Paradox I most disagree with is the idea that the conventional balance of forces is just not that important. A world in which Russian forces succeed in their 2022 knock-out attempt and have to face a grinding geurrila was is a very different one than our own where they were thwarted in their objective. Making the conquest alternative to negotiated agreement unappealing is only part of warding off the risk of a much worse world in coming years, but it's the one I'm most focused on. And I think Biden did a decent job at it, albeit with the critical mistake of not embracing the necessity of Europe developing as an independent power center.
None of this is remotely new to you, and I do still owe a read of the Rivalry, and ultimately I'm arguing for striking a balance as the range of Rivalry risks you describe are quite real. But I do think that it's worth stating that I think the utility of conquest is what's freaking out a lot of those of us you are critiquing rather than Chinese hegemony strictly defined.
I appreciate your view! It’s one I well considered and even once held. Just two things though: 1) Pacific Power Paradox does not say conventional balance of forces don’t matter (it says they only matter in specific contexts not at the abstract global level); 2) the hegemon’s violations of sovereign borders are a repudiation of hegemony when one of the public goods it provides are the stability of sovereign borders.
Makes sense regarding global versus situational. Obviously a Taiwan scenario is a highly challenging one for the United States for distance reasons, but there are also ways to consider it that would involve a porcupine strategy rather than pouring more into force projection.
Point taken regarding sovereign borders writ-large. That's one where there is a great deal more U.S. hypocrisy. I do think Ben Rhodes swap to being publicly critical of the Libya war is probably an indication of skepticism of regime change efforts, even with humanitarian dressing, well beyond the left.
I'd differentiate the U.S. largely providing a club-good of sovereign border respect and reinforcing a public good of the more limited not changing borders with force and that the former is part of the reason the global south has not expressed much interest in bearing costs to protect the ladder.
My main point is that as we're all debating the forms of a post-hegemonic world, there's value in differentiating what was provided imperfectly as a public good which is now at risk, public [goods] that broke down (e.g. WTO enforcement), and principles that were only rarely public good despite rhetoric (though might offer a promise of a larger coalition if it was on the table).
So, as a normie international relations liberal, I can accept most of your premises about China here (let's set aside good neighbor analogy) but I think your definition of hegemony, while perfectly reasonable, is not what Walt or standard Washignton discourse is talking about.
So agree to be condemned for my view that the post-WWII and post-Cold War era was on the balance good while America certainly did horrific things during it on a grand scale.
So I hold the modal international relations liberal view that the norm against changes borders with force is a critical underlying part of that order. It's a subset of "the stability of a norm-based political order (sovereign borders)" but a vital one and one that is a foundational part of any world order that lmits domination. (Regarding the larger norm, the U.S. has violated sovereignty in many ways, including interventions that broke the rules that it established and were terrible ideas on both prudential and humanitarian grounds. The second and third Gulf wars both being examples that are contributing directly to U.S. decline for a multitude of reasons).
Russia did not need the opportunity to become a regional hegemon to invade Ukraine in 2014 or 2022. China does not need the power to become a regional hegemon to invade Taiwan (admittedly an edge case in international law), in the South China sea, or with India.
The premise in Pacific Power Paradox I most disagree with is the idea that the conventional balance of forces is just not that important. A world in which Russian forces succeed in their 2022 knock-out attempt and have to face a grinding geurrila was is a very different one than our own where they were thwarted in their objective. Making the conquest alternative to negotiated agreement unappealing is only part of warding off the risk of a much worse world in coming years, but it's the one I'm most focused on. And I think Biden did a decent job at it, albeit with the critical mistake of not embracing the necessity of Europe developing as an independent power center.
None of this is remotely new to you, and I do still owe a read of the Rivalry, and ultimately I'm arguing for striking a balance as the range of Rivalry risks you describe are quite real. But I do think that it's worth stating that I think the utility of conquest is what's freaking out a lot of those of us you are critiquing rather than Chinese hegemony strictly defined.
I appreciate your view! It’s one I well considered and even once held. Just two things though: 1) Pacific Power Paradox does not say conventional balance of forces don’t matter (it says they only matter in specific contexts not at the abstract global level); 2) the hegemon’s violations of sovereign borders are a repudiation of hegemony when one of the public goods it provides are the stability of sovereign borders.
Thanks for the reply!
Makes sense regarding global versus situational. Obviously a Taiwan scenario is a highly challenging one for the United States for distance reasons, but there are also ways to consider it that would involve a porcupine strategy rather than pouring more into force projection.
Point taken regarding sovereign borders writ-large. That's one where there is a great deal more U.S. hypocrisy. I do think Ben Rhodes swap to being publicly critical of the Libya war is probably an indication of skepticism of regime change efforts, even with humanitarian dressing, well beyond the left.
I'd differentiate the U.S. largely providing a club-good of sovereign border respect and reinforcing a public good of the more limited not changing borders with force and that the former is part of the reason the global south has not expressed much interest in bearing costs to protect the ladder.
My main point is that as we're all debating the forms of a post-hegemonic world, there's value in differentiating what was provided imperfectly as a public good which is now at risk, public [goods] that broke down (e.g. WTO enforcement), and principles that were only rarely public good despite rhetoric (though might offer a promise of a larger coalition if it was on the table).