European Defense: First the Horror Vacui, Then…What?
The following guest post comes from Dr. Lutz Unterseher, correspondent from Berlin.
President Trump has opened Europe’s eyes, but not in the way I might have hoped: American protection against the “new threat” from Russia is now conditional on arbitrary demands from Washington—such as devoting 5 percent of GDP to defense—and even then it’s not a reliable guarantee.
Trump has pulled the rug from under NATO’s reason for existing. For most of the alliance’s history, Europeans were more than willing to believe in a US security guarantee in the form of “extended deterrence”—the extension of America’s strategic nuclear forces being threatened on their behalf, to prevent European countries from befalling a nuclear attack. All the while, though, analysts in Washington were exploring concepts for employing “tactical” nuclear weapons in a way they hoped would confine a nuclear war to European soil. The actual history of American thinking about—and investments made in—the ultimate weapon undermined the story of America as Europe’s protector.
If Europe opened its eyes to history, it would realize the United States was not making Europe secure all these years; the myth of American protection via NATO was a fiction of convenience for European politicians to avoid thinking too hard about that which might provide for a genuine continental security.
But with Trump exposing the lie of American reliability, the child has fallen into the well: Europeans now feel exposed—naked, one might say—in a space that seems empty and unprotected: horror vacui.
In a frantic search for a military shield of their own, the Europeans are scrambling to meet at least some portion of Trump’s percentage spending target. Officials talk about raising spending into the range of 2.5 to 3.5 percent of GDP. For several of Europe’s more developed countries, that level, still well short of Trump’s demand, would seriously undermine the welfare state—just at a time when democracy is under strain everywhere.
Large increases in military spending will further postpone many already overdue investments in national infrastructure across Europe. As a result, Europe’s economy will slip behind the United States and other major economic blocs, accelerating a world of competitive economic nationalisms in which Europe is likely to bring up the rear.
Such a thrust, of course, aligns too perfectly with Donald Trump’s vision—one he can realize more effectively by pushing Europe’s defense spending higher than by resorting to harmful trade tariffs, though he’s clearly doing both.
There should be no doubt that Russia poses a threat to Europe. Yet, it is worth noting a few basic facts, not to downplay matters, but to maintain clarity:
Ukraine, despite its relative weakness, has stood up to Russia’s superior force for more than three years, even though Western arms support often arrived too late and frequently did not match the country’s needs.
In 2024, European Union countries together spent €326 billion on defense. In contrast, Russia—including its internal security outlays—spent about half of that. The EU nations also did not have significantly fewer military personnel overall.
Importantly, Russia cannot project its entire military against Europe—security requirements in the Far East and Central Asia tie down a considerable portion of Russia’s military.
Taking these facts into account, a dramatic arms buildup in Europe is hard to justify. Under current tensions, the priority should be to set aside nationalisms, pool resources, and form a truly integrated European army, working within EU institutions, ideally “borrowing” NATO’s existing infrastructure.
This joint force should be dedicated to strategic (non-offensive, non-provocative) defense—protecting home territory. Expensive, high-end tools for long-range power projection will be superfluous. US capabilities in NATO do not need one-for-one substitutions. Nonetheless, at the operational-tactical level, a European defense force should retain a force structure and force posture capable of flexibly supporting neighbors under threat. But that requires a disciplined strategy and budget, not arms-racing with Russia or panic-spending to compensate for an extortionist America.
What about responding to nuclear threats? Since the American deterrent is not guaranteed to be available to Europe, attention turns to France. Its nuclear “minimum deterrent” is sufficient for stability—serving as an ultimate insurance policy, not as a provocative means of nuclear warfighting. Paris has already signaled that it might be willing to “Europeanize” its strategic capability. That is good enough for our period of transition.
Lutz Unterseher is a sociologist and political scientist. As director since 1980 of the Study Group on Alternative Security Policy (SAS), he originated the concept of Confidence-Building Defence. Working in international relations and military theory, he has detailed defense strategies and force postures in consultations with political parties, governments, and armed forces. His recent publications on European defense include Ukraine: Options for a Confidence-Building Defense and “European Army”: A Thought Experiment.
Nice piece. I would love to hear more about the challenges to forming a united European military force
Seems like American ideas of how other countries ‘defend’ themselves is heavily influenced by the US military’s bias toward the offense. I wonder if a European ‘strategic defense’ posture is only possible with a major break with the US. I mean, that’s the only way Europe could co-opt NATO’s existing infrastructure toward this end, right?