Seems like American ideas of how other countries ‘defend’ themselves is heavily influenced by the US military’s bias toward the offense. I wonder if a European ‘strategic defense’ posture is only possible with a major break with the US. I mean, that’s the only way Europe could co-opt NATO’s existing infrastructure toward this end, right?
Lutz hails from a tradition of “non-offensive defense” that I’ve been studying intensely the last couple years. I even started teaching about it. But his view has very little purchase in Europe right now (and since 2022). To your point, I think European elites are intellectually co-opted by the American way of thinking about defense. What I’m not sure of at this point is whether even a break from the US will be enough for them to take seriously what ideas in the non-offensive defense tradition can offer them
I hope that more than a handful of Europeans will challenge the "American way of war" and challenge their officials to develop much less offensive/aggressive forms of defense, especially ones that don't hold themselves and the world hostage to the use of nuclear threats (on all sides, as was the practice in the Cold War.)
What is extraordinary about this moment is that Trump appears to want a strategic break with Europe (he sees an advantage in the tariff-based economic war he has launched). So far, most European leaders seem to be in an initial state of denial and ready to beg Washington to tell them, "It ain't so!" Yet it sure seems it is so! That's why they are likely to need to consider an EU army seriously.
Hey Van, great guest post. On the topic of European defense, would you consider doing a piece (or having another guest piece) on Die Linke's position on the Russia Ukraine war? (Apologies if I missed any writing you've already done on it.) Here in Germany I've had (at this point too many) conversations with people who want to vote for them but are dissuaded by their position on Russia and Ukraine, and so I'd love to hear your take on it.
Hmmm, the short version is that it seems to be the curse of German leftists that they cannot have a left party that checks every box, and that even the two parties nominally at the far left end of the spectrum each have one or more poison pills built in. Die Linke with their squishy prevaricating on peace and weapons and especially loans for weapons (a very sore point for German leftists because of 1914), and BSW with their xenophobia and environmental positions. You’d have to break their positions apart and reassemble a perfect left party from the pieces. Why Die Linke veers mainstream on the question of peace in Ukraine and German rearmament, I can only guess. Best I can come up is they like to be “nice”, “salonfähig”, not scary, grim or iffy red-brown. This seems to be working for them, electorally: their current headlining candidates are these enormously appealing political talents, good on TV talk shows and at retail politics.
Thanks for the response! One thing I don't fully understand though is that in the first part of your response you say that Die Linke does some "squishy prevaricating" re: peace and weapons - which is exactly the reason most people who (at least say they) would otherwise vote for Die Linke say that they do not vote for them - but then later on you say that they "veer mainstream". In what way do they veer mainstream on this? No doubt that they're doing something right, but it seems to me that if they're doing well it's more despite their foreign policy than thanks to it, but I'm certainly open to arguments that that wasn't the case.
I don't know the size of the potential voter pool wanting principled leftist positions on everything AND also a radical anti-militarist foreign policy. I expect not all that much, probably in the low single digits? I don't think Die Linke is the sort of party that makes cold calculations based on micro-polling and decides that being consistently anti-war, anti-conscription, anti-weapons is either not worth it in terms of voter appeal or even counterproductive. It seems to me that their recent rise has been unexpected and things are dynamic inside this party, as opposed to disciplined. Yes, they're doing well despite their foreign policy, but then again there is no consensus within the party on key issues. By "veering to the mainstream" I mean not so much electoral appeal as signalling to those parts of the population who will never vote for them that they are "safe", respectable and available for constructive policy-making. That can be done by joining ranks with the mainstream position that Russia started a war of aggression (no contest from me on that) and therefore the good guys have to fight back and we have to support them.
I just read this. It's about the European left, not just Die Linke, but I think the diagnosis of ideological confusion fits: the inability to imagine international relations outside the liberal, rules-based-order framework for decades. The author proposes a revolutionary realpolitik as an alternative to militarism and imperialism.
"Die Linke, Germany's left-wing party, has taken a nuanced stance on the Ukraine-Russia conflict. They have condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a violation of international law and called for the withdrawal of Russian troops 1.
2. However, they also criticize NATO's eastward expansion, arguing that it has contributed to tensions in the region. 1 Die Linke advocates for diplomacy and negotiations over military solutions, opposing further arms deliveries to Ukraine and emphasizing the need for humanitarian aid and a peaceful resolution 2.
"Their position reflects a broader ideological commitment to anti-militarism and international law, though it has sparked internal debates and external criticism. It’s a balancing act between condemning aggression and promoting de-escalation.
Nice piece. I would love to hear more about the challenges to forming a united European military force
Seems like American ideas of how other countries ‘defend’ themselves is heavily influenced by the US military’s bias toward the offense. I wonder if a European ‘strategic defense’ posture is only possible with a major break with the US. I mean, that’s the only way Europe could co-opt NATO’s existing infrastructure toward this end, right?
Lutz hails from a tradition of “non-offensive defense” that I’ve been studying intensely the last couple years. I even started teaching about it. But his view has very little purchase in Europe right now (and since 2022). To your point, I think European elites are intellectually co-opted by the American way of thinking about defense. What I’m not sure of at this point is whether even a break from the US will be enough for them to take seriously what ideas in the non-offensive defense tradition can offer them
I hope that more than a handful of Europeans will challenge the "American way of war" and challenge their officials to develop much less offensive/aggressive forms of defense, especially ones that don't hold themselves and the world hostage to the use of nuclear threats (on all sides, as was the practice in the Cold War.)
What is extraordinary about this moment is that Trump appears to want a strategic break with Europe (he sees an advantage in the tariff-based economic war he has launched). So far, most European leaders seem to be in an initial state of denial and ready to beg Washington to tell them, "It ain't so!" Yet it sure seems it is so! That's why they are likely to need to consider an EU army seriously.
Hey Van, great guest post. On the topic of European defense, would you consider doing a piece (or having another guest piece) on Die Linke's position on the Russia Ukraine war? (Apologies if I missed any writing you've already done on it.) Here in Germany I've had (at this point too many) conversations with people who want to vote for them but are dissuaded by their position on Russia and Ukraine, and so I'd love to hear your take on it.
Thanks and keep up the good work!
Thanks! I’d have to do a lot more research to have a readable take myself, but I’m open to a guest post on Die Linke
@Almut Rochowanski , do you have a take on this?
Hmmm, the short version is that it seems to be the curse of German leftists that they cannot have a left party that checks every box, and that even the two parties nominally at the far left end of the spectrum each have one or more poison pills built in. Die Linke with their squishy prevaricating on peace and weapons and especially loans for weapons (a very sore point for German leftists because of 1914), and BSW with their xenophobia and environmental positions. You’d have to break their positions apart and reassemble a perfect left party from the pieces. Why Die Linke veers mainstream on the question of peace in Ukraine and German rearmament, I can only guess. Best I can come up is they like to be “nice”, “salonfähig”, not scary, grim or iffy red-brown. This seems to be working for them, electorally: their current headlining candidates are these enormously appealing political talents, good on TV talk shows and at retail politics.
Thanks for the response! One thing I don't fully understand though is that in the first part of your response you say that Die Linke does some "squishy prevaricating" re: peace and weapons - which is exactly the reason most people who (at least say they) would otherwise vote for Die Linke say that they do not vote for them - but then later on you say that they "veer mainstream". In what way do they veer mainstream on this? No doubt that they're doing something right, but it seems to me that if they're doing well it's more despite their foreign policy than thanks to it, but I'm certainly open to arguments that that wasn't the case.
I don't know the size of the potential voter pool wanting principled leftist positions on everything AND also a radical anti-militarist foreign policy. I expect not all that much, probably in the low single digits? I don't think Die Linke is the sort of party that makes cold calculations based on micro-polling and decides that being consistently anti-war, anti-conscription, anti-weapons is either not worth it in terms of voter appeal or even counterproductive. It seems to me that their recent rise has been unexpected and things are dynamic inside this party, as opposed to disciplined. Yes, they're doing well despite their foreign policy, but then again there is no consensus within the party on key issues. By "veering to the mainstream" I mean not so much electoral appeal as signalling to those parts of the population who will never vote for them that they are "safe", respectable and available for constructive policy-making. That can be done by joining ranks with the mainstream position that Russia started a war of aggression (no contest from me on that) and therefore the good guys have to fight back and we have to support them.
I just read this. It's about the European left, not just Die Linke, but I think the diagnosis of ideological confusion fits: the inability to imagine international relations outside the liberal, rules-based-order framework for decades. The author proposes a revolutionary realpolitik as an alternative to militarism and imperialism.
https://jacobin.de/artikel/zeitenwen-de-linke-nato-usa-russland-ukrainekrieg-aufruestung
According to MS Copilot AI bot:
"Die Linke, Germany's left-wing party, has taken a nuanced stance on the Ukraine-Russia conflict. They have condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a violation of international law and called for the withdrawal of Russian troops 1.
2. However, they also criticize NATO's eastward expansion, arguing that it has contributed to tensions in the region. 1 Die Linke advocates for diplomacy and negotiations over military solutions, opposing further arms deliveries to Ukraine and emphasizing the need for humanitarian aid and a peaceful resolution 2.
"Their position reflects a broader ideological commitment to anti-militarism and international law, though it has sparked internal debates and external criticism. It’s a balancing act between condemning aggression and promoting de-escalation.
1 en.die-linke.de 2www.die-linke.de
Of course, there are often devils in the details. Perhaps there is human being somewhere in the loop who can provide more detail and analysis?
Oh, now I see a real human being, and a knowledgeable one, is in the loop - Almut Rochowanski. I am hereby kicking the AI copilot out of the cockpit.