"If Kamala loses, how will they explain the loss while exempting America’s disastrous, wildly unpopular foreign policy?"
Its pretty simple. You say that the administration she was part of took an unpopular position on immigration for two years before belatedly changing tack, and that this plus inflation concerns caused her to face headwinds that she couldn't ultimately overcome. Not to say that this is the only possible narrative or reason, but its a perfectly coherent narrative that fits the facts, including voter priorities per polls, in which inflation and immigration dwarf FP/natsec as concerns.
I think a broader problem in terms of learning lessons from American elections is that the electoral college coupled with consistently close races make it hard to derive any meaning from the results. 2012 is a good example - everyone "knew" for sure that the GOP needed to moderate on immigration to tap the surge of young diverse voters Obama had brought to the polls. In response, the GOP nominated the exact opposite of that and won anyways, including in states like Florida where it was thought such an approach couldn't work.
That seems plausible enough. And U.S. foreign policy being an issue that doesn't swing many votes, at least when there aren't notable U.S. casualties is a longstanding political science theory and not one being adopted by convenience.
The bit about Netanyahu is true, but I can't imagine it makes the top 10 reasons for his and his govt's actions.
The casualties piece is also important, and why people who liken Biden/Gaza to LBJ/Vietnam drive me up the wall. US support to its partners' brutal military campaigns is hardly exceptional (unfortunately) but its not like Bangladesh 1971 or Indonesia 1967 moved votes. I'll grant that Israel has more domestic resonance than those, but its a much better comparison in terms of cost to the average American than Vietnam.
I figure management of a great power patron relationship probably is in his government top 5 priorities, but I'm not a regionalist, so you might be right that any U.S. partisan politics implications is not be in his top 10.
I do think that both domestic resonance and the level of reporting do make a difference, but that your point on the inaptness of Vietnam as an analogy definitely holds in my view. For my own work, I need to study Bangladesh 1971 and Indonesia 1967 and have a better sense of the level of reporting at the time and also their position in U.S. military assistance (both in term of share from the U.S. and their own reliance). But you do starkly lay out why the historical disconnect between U.S. foreign policy and any domestic political implications can be a rather dismal one.
It’s too hard for the think tanker policy types in DC (drezner is actually pretty good) to acknowledge primacy gains support if you can hide its costs and its effects on other countries. Gaza can’t be hidden
"If Kamala loses, how will they explain the loss while exempting America’s disastrous, wildly unpopular foreign policy?"
Its pretty simple. You say that the administration she was part of took an unpopular position on immigration for two years before belatedly changing tack, and that this plus inflation concerns caused her to face headwinds that she couldn't ultimately overcome. Not to say that this is the only possible narrative or reason, but its a perfectly coherent narrative that fits the facts, including voter priorities per polls, in which inflation and immigration dwarf FP/natsec as concerns.
I think a broader problem in terms of learning lessons from American elections is that the electoral college coupled with consistently close races make it hard to derive any meaning from the results. 2012 is a good example - everyone "knew" for sure that the GOP needed to moderate on immigration to tap the surge of young diverse voters Obama had brought to the polls. In response, the GOP nominated the exact opposite of that and won anyways, including in states like Florida where it was thought such an approach couldn't work.
That seems plausible enough. And U.S. foreign policy being an issue that doesn't swing many votes, at least when there aren't notable U.S. casualties is a longstanding political science theory and not one being adopted by convenience.
I think Paul Musgrave lays out the uncertainty of the electoral math pretty well: https://substack.com/@musgrave/p-150246551
That said, PM. Netanyahu has openly sided with the Republican party for years and escalation has the chance to heighten a wedge issue for Democrats.
The bit about Netanyahu is true, but I can't imagine it makes the top 10 reasons for his and his govt's actions.
The casualties piece is also important, and why people who liken Biden/Gaza to LBJ/Vietnam drive me up the wall. US support to its partners' brutal military campaigns is hardly exceptional (unfortunately) but its not like Bangladesh 1971 or Indonesia 1967 moved votes. I'll grant that Israel has more domestic resonance than those, but its a much better comparison in terms of cost to the average American than Vietnam.
I figure management of a great power patron relationship probably is in his government top 5 priorities, but I'm not a regionalist, so you might be right that any U.S. partisan politics implications is not be in his top 10.
I do think that both domestic resonance and the level of reporting do make a difference, but that your point on the inaptness of Vietnam as an analogy definitely holds in my view. For my own work, I need to study Bangladesh 1971 and Indonesia 1967 and have a better sense of the level of reporting at the time and also their position in U.S. military assistance (both in term of share from the U.S. and their own reliance). But you do starkly lay out why the historical disconnect between U.S. foreign policy and any domestic political implications can be a rather dismal one.
It’s too hard for the think tanker policy types in DC (drezner is actually pretty good) to acknowledge primacy gains support if you can hide its costs and its effects on other countries. Gaza can’t be hidden